Strange enough, the impacts of URBAN have been based on the opinion of national evaluators. No attempt has been made to measure, for example, the number of jobs created for the 15-24 year old .By the way, the top-three impacts were physical improvements, improved socio-economic conditions, and social capital impacts. Lost in verbosity, difficulties in understanding EC documents and procedures by those involved in the program proved to be an important factor hindering success.
In the light of the 'riots' or 'revolts' happening in the French cites in 2005 (and again in 2007), the evaluators were unable to capture what was brewing in Clichy-sous-Bois, Aulnay-sou-Bois and other suburbs. An early warning woulkd have been appropriate as it was possible to detect the underlying structural conditions (although the triggering events are unpredictable). One is left with the feeling that the evaluators ('straight jacketed, by the methodology prescribed by the European Commission?) lacked the discernment and understanding necessary to penetrate the heart of the matter. Maybe in future, the Commission should not only want to prove 'Community value added', but should also be encouraged to investigate bad practice, too.
URBAN has not replaced national efforts, certainly not in the case where national urban policies exist. Where they do not exist, they should be stimulated. It cannot be that the EU has to solve the problems of the banlieue for France or, for example, the problem of waste disposal in Naples. On the other hand, to achieve subsidiarity, also appears to be a problem within member countries. What about the key actors 'close to the ground' and, in particular, those for whom the programs are finally implemented. Citizen participation was probably best catered to by a community- focused approach as practiced in the UK. Overall, a lack of active participation has been a factor hindering the success of URBAN. Hence the 'success story' of citizen participation has to be taken with a pinch of salt.